The
Prince is a letter by Machiavelli to the Medici family
summarizing his observations and experiences of Italy’s tumultuous 15th
and early 16th centuries. It is a letter of advice on how to keep
power (and presumably an unsuccessful attempt by Machiavelli to return
to a position in the government) in which Machiavelli expounds a theory
of government that constrasts sharply to that of his moralizing
colleagues writing similar letters. Unlike his colleagues, who
wrote advice based on how government ought to work, Machiavelli
observed the fortunes of his contemporary leaders and analyzed the
history of past leaders to create an empirical guideline. It is a
testament to his thorough treatment that his analysis is still
applicable to the modern State; the reader will be able to easily
note some examples of modern history that corroborate his assertions.
Machiavelli limits himself to the “principality”, a state which is
headed by a ruler, or prince. First there is the “mixed” or
annexed state, which is difficult to hold unless the occupier
personally lives there or the state is used to an authoritarian
system. Next there is the principality gained through ability,
which is difficult to gain but easy to keep, since a necessary
precondition is superb ability. By contrast, there is the state
gained through the use of others, which is easy to acquire, but unless
the new ruler is very able, it will be quickly lost. There is the
method of cruelty, which will work if the cruelty is limited to the
very early rule (i.e. killing any competition) but not
afterwards. Finally, there is the elected ruler, who must ensure that the nobles
whose interests do not match the rulers must be hindered, and who must
ensure that the people, who are ultimately his support, have a
favorable opinion of him.
The military is presented as the primary means of measuring a
state. Mercenaries were the usual force employed in Italy at this
time, but Machiavelli asserts that they are useless, because they have
no personal interest in the outcome and are therefore unwilling to risk
much personally. Foreign troops, another common source, are worse
than useless, because if they win, you are at their mercy. Rather, the strong state is one that has its own army. Since the
native army must be led by the ruler, it follows that the ruler must
be, above all, concerned with military matters and gaining military
strategical insight.
There are certain character traits which are generally held to be
admirable in a ruler and a ruler should cultivate the appearance of
those traits. Very often, however, actually possessing those
characteristics will undo a ruler, simply because “how men live is so
different from how they should live”. For example, generosity is
held to be a good characteristic. However, too much generosity
will require the ruler to raise taxes to pay for the generosity. If he is more miserly, however, he will have ample funds for what is
needed and the citizens will retain a larger portion of their
income. Similarly, one would wish to be loved, but men will
betray those they love when it proves to their advantage, whereas they
will always obey the one they fear. So power is more easily
retained by being feared, provided that the ruler is not hated
(primarily caused by confiscation of property or dishonoring the
womenfolk) or despised.
Finally, Machiavelli has a short section on Fortune, concluding that
about half of our life is outside of our control. These effects
can be mitigated, much like floods can be prevented by building
dykes. Ultimately, however, he concludes that each man has a
natural mode of operation (for example, impetuosity or caution) which
he is rather powerless to change. So if circumstances favor your
mode of operation, you will be successful, otherwise you will not.
The Prince is primarily a
treatise on the
retention of
power. Most readers are struck by his unappologetically amoral
approach to retaining power, but Machiavelli’s aim is a method of
retaining power in this imperfect world, not a description of how
government would ideally work. Indeed, it would be Machiavelli’s
assertion that the ruler who prizes morality above retention of power
will not fail to lose the latter, and in order to retain power, one
must sacrifice flawless morality.
The Prince is a summary of how Men
react to governments and rulers; given these observed reactions,
it advises certain courses of actions. It is cogently argued and
illustrated with well-explained examples so that the reader cannot fail
to understand the principles, which have a timeless practical
wisdom. If the advice seems to disregard common moral
practice, perhaps the flaw is not as much in Machiavelli’s advice as it
is in the Men whose nature requires this departure in order to be
governed.
Review: 10
Logically laid out, thorough, and well
illustrated with examples. The writing is very frugal and
sometimes further discussion might reveal more subtle points. The
majority of his examples are contemporary and a larger window of time
would also be illustrative (but then, it was the wide variety of
contemporary successes and failures which led to this work). I
would rate this as 9.5 because the examples and explanations could be
expanded, but that was not his purpose, and the fact that it was still
around for me to read almost 500 years later is prima facie evidence of its quality.
- Hereditary principalities: easy to maintain because it is
sufficient to maintain the status quo,
partly because “a natural ruler has fewer reasons and less need to harm
others”. Furthermore, the continuity of the family strengthens
people’s support and attackers must offer more than a mere change of
governments. It is easy for a displaced ruler to reclaim the
government.
- Newly acquired principalities:
- An annexed principality with different customs than the
annexing nation requires either relocating there (i.e. direct rule) or
colonies (cheaper than occupation and easier on the populace).
- Conquerors “welcomed” by the conquered nation are expected to
improve conditions but the nature of armies is injury and political
realities require more, so that the newly conquered are again
discontented.
- Rulers should weaken those who are powerful within the country
and protect (but not strengthen) minor neighboring powers.
- Problems must be detected early when they are solvable.
- There are two types of principalities
- King/ruler with hereditary nobles: easier to conquer
(nobles have less allegience to the king) but harder to hold (nobles
have memory of their former power)
- Hereditary king/ruler with appointed administrators: harder to conquer (administrators owe their position to the ruler and
have no incentive to support another) but easier to maintain.
- (This is why Persia did not rebel after Alexander’s death, even
though he ruled it for only a few years)
- Principalities that were formerly free before you conquered them
can only be held by you living there or by destroying the
cities/institutions of freedom.
- A citizen who becomes a ruler by his skill (and luck of being the
right type of person in the right time) has a harder time succeeding
(people have little incentive to help him) but their ability ensures
they maintain their position.
- Those who become ruler through luck or favor of others come to
power easily but cannot maintain it because their position depends on
favor of others (which is notoriously undependable) and they do not
have an innate skill.
- A citizen who becomes ruler by murdering and replacing the elite
will succeed ony if all the evil deeds are done early and no
more. This way the populace will fear him, otherwise they are
disgusted by him.
- Citizens who become rulers by support of nobles have difficulty
maintaining rule because the nobles feel they are equal to him. Citizens who become rulers by popular support need only keep the people
well disposed.
- It is problematic for a civil ruler to try to become absolute
because the people are accustomed to obeying the officials and may not
obey him in a crisis.
- Honor and esteem nobles who “conduct themselves in a way that
links your success with theirs”. Nobles who do not “commit
themselves to you” are fine if it is from lack of ambition, but if from
ambition you should fear them.
- The strength of a principality is the ability of the ruler to
defend himself from siege.
- “For so many unexpected things can happen in this world that it
is virtually impossible to keep an army encamped idly in a siege for a
whole year.”
- The German states [were] fairly independent of the German
Emperor because they each had their own defense.
- Ecclesiastical principalities are acquired through luck and
maintained with little effort because their authority comes from God
(i.e. a widely accepted spiritual source).
- Mercenaries are useless: they have little incentive to die
on your behalf (thus they do not fight valiantly), if they are very
capable they are likely to aspire to greater things, and “if they are
mediocre, you will be ruined as a matter of course”. Machiavelli
attributes Italy’s turmoil to the use of mercenaries.
- Auxiliaries (foreign troops) are extremely dangerous because you
are at their mercy if they are victorious.
- The Roman Empire began to decline only when it began to use the
Goths as mercenaries “because that policy began to sap the strength of
the Roman Empire; and all the vigor that was drained from it was
received by the Goths”
- “...any principality that does not have its own army cannot be
secure”
- “A ruler, then, should have no other objective and no other
concern, nor occupy himself with anything else except war and its
methods and practices, for this pertains only to those who rule.”
- Military ability makes rulers from citizens and the lack of it
makes citizens of rulers.
- Hunt frequently (physical exertion and familiarization with the
terrain), read historical works to discover lessons and pitfalls of
other great men.
- “How men live is so different from how they should live that a
ruler who does not do what is generally done, but persists in doing
what ought to be done, will undermine his power rather than maintain
it. If a ruler who wants always to at honorably is surrounded by
many unscrupulous men his downfall is inevitable. Therefore, a
ruler who wishes to maintain his power must be prepared to act
immorally [i.e. break promises, murder, etc.] when this because
necessary. ... because it is not possible to have [every
admirable virtue] and because circumstances do not permit living a
completely virtuous life, one must be sufficiently prudent to know how
to avoid becoming notorious for those vices which would destroy one’s
power ... yet one should not be troubled about becoming notorious for
those vices without which it is difficult to preserve one’s power” (p.
55)
- Generosity is one of those power-destroying vices, because
generosity comes at the expense of taxing the people, which eventually
becomes rapacious. Miserliness, generally considered a vice, is
power enhancing because it enables low taxes but a full coffer for
defense.
- It is best if you are both feared and loved, but if that is not
possible, it is better to be feared [because of judicious cruelty to
preserve order] than to be loved, because men are fickly—they are
devoted to you only until it no longer benefits themselves, then they
quickly abandon you. However, one should avoid being hated, which
can be accomplished by execution only when proven necessary, restraint
of seizing property and womenfolk.
- Avoid at all costs seizing property because it is a addicting
habit and men forget the killing of a father more quickly than loss of
property[/income]. The commentary notes that “In an almost
contemporaneous piece, Machiavelli says that everyone knows that a
change in regime will not bring relatives back to life, but it could
well result in one’s property being restored.”
- Do not keep promises if the reasons for making are no longer
relevant. Always be sure to appear “merciful, trustworthy,
upright, human, and devout”, although be prepared to disregard these
when necessary.
- Avoid contempt and hatred:
- Hatred can be avoided by not seizing subjects’ women or
property. (But implied is that if property of a few opponents is
siezed, their ambitions can be kept under control)
- Contempt is avoided by “contriv[ing] hat his actions should
display grandeur, courage, seriousness, and strength, and [that] his
decisions about the private disputes of his subjects should be
irrevocable ... so that no one should think of lying to him or scheming
to trick him”
- Such an image will produce an excellent reputation that will
prevent internal plots, because the people are satisfied.
- Roman emperors illustrate this: “For it was hard to
satisfy both the soldiers and the people: the reason was that the
people liked a peaceful life, and consequently wanted to have modrate
rulers, whereas the soldiers wanted warlike rulers, who were arrogant,
cruel, and rapacious. The soldiers wanted the people to be
treated harshly by rulers, so that they could have [booty and regular
pay] and give vent to their own rapacity and cruelty. The outcome
was that those emperors who (either through natural deficiencies or
lack of experience) did not acquire sufficient prestige to restrain
both the soldiers and the people always failed. ... Consequently, the
emperors who stood specially in need of support (because they were new
rulers) favored the soldiers rather than the people. However,
whether this profited them ... depended on whether they were capable of
keeping the respect of the soldiers”
- Marcus Aurelius: moderate, just, kind. Only
succeeded because the authority was hereditary.
- Pertinax: like Marcus in character, but the soldiers
did not want him to be emperor and they disliked the discipline he
imposed on them (i.e. they hated him [and despised him because of his
age])
- Alexander: moderate, just. Killed because he was
controlled by his mother (i.e. weak)
- Severus: cruel, rapacious, but very skillful. The
people were amazed by his actions and the soldiers were
satisfied. So he maintained power.
- Antonious: Disciplined soldier (thus admired by the
army) but his wanton killing made everyone, even the army afraid of him.
- Commodus: Inherited power from Marcus Aurelius, but was
cruel and barbaric, so was despised by the people. Diminished his
dignity by fighting in the arena, so lost the respect of the army.
- In “modern” states, the people tend to have more power than the
army, so it is most important to satisfy them. Some, though, like
the Sultan of Turkey, depends on a large armed force, so he must
satisfy them more.
- “If a ruler is more afraid of his own subjects than foreigners,
he should build fortresses [this is not referring to normal defences
like strong city walls but more like fortified refuges]; but a ruler
who is more afraid of foreigners than of his own subjects should not
build them ... [but] the best fortress a ruler can have is not to be
hated by the people: for if you possess fortresses and the people
hate you, having fortresses will not save you, since if the people rise
up there will never be any lack of foreign powers ready to help them”
(p. 75)
- Some rulers promote internal factions to avoid any one becoming
powerful, but this does not permit a strong defense against another
State.
- Do not disarm the people (as a new ruler) and arm them if they
are not already. Disarming them offends them are requires the use
of mercenaries.
- Vanquishing difficulties enhances a ruler’s prestige. Thus new rulers encourage enemies so that the can defeat them.
- Reputation is gained by “undertaking great campaigns and
performing unusual deeds”.
- Dispense rewards or punishments in a way that “will be much
talked about”.
- Be either an staunch enemy or ally; do not be neutral
(depending on the outcome, you might be plundered by the winner or
considered a doubtful ally)
- Always intervene:
- If those you are helping lose, they will at least be likely
to show you gratitude in the future
- If those you are helping win, their honor will prevent them
from attacking you and friendship will be formed. “Moreover,
victories are never so decisive that the victor does not need to be
careful, and especially about acting justly.”
- If none are a threat to you, you cause the downfall of one,
and put the winner at your mercy (see notes on Auxiliaries). Never ally with one more powerful than you unless absolutely necessary.
- Be a patron of the arts, provide public entertainment during
festivals, visit the guilds, but in such a manner as enhances “the
prestige of [your] office, for this is something that should never be
diminished”.
- An excellent ruler will have excellent ministers (and
vice-versa); a ruler’s quality can be judged by his
officials. Do not choose a man who thinks more of his interests
than yours (he is not trustable); but a loyal servant should be
given “golden shackles” so that he is dependent on you.
- Shun flatters. Make sure that everyone knows that “the
truth does not offend you”, but only when you ask for it. If you
allow anyone to speak frankly at any time, you diminish the augustness
of your office. Do not waver about decisions.
- Vagueries of fortune can be minimized by wise policies. However, each of us has a certain temperament, which we cannot change,
either caution or impetuousity, and it is luck that determines whether
we are born to a time which matches our temperament. However, err
on the side of impetuousity.
- Machiavelli closes with requests that the (unnamed) Medici family
fix the problems of Italy through wise government.