Until the High Middle Ages in the 12th century, Christianity had a
synthesis with Platonism. This is not because Greek philosophy corrupted
the pure Hebrew faith (which Boersma notes was a claim advanced by a
liberal theologian), since Christians flatly rejected Platonism’s pantheism, its
matter-bad-spirit-good dichotomy, and its assumption that unity was
perfection but multiplicity was imperfection. Christians did integrate
Platonism’s articulation of participation in the divine unity (which I
note is in 2 Peter 1:4: “partakers of the divine nature”), and this
synthesis became the sacramental view, which in the West held from the
early Church fathers until the 12th century.
A sacrament, here, is different than a symbol. A symbol is unrelated to
what it points to: no one swerves to miss the deer on the warning sign. A
sacrament also participates in what it points to. C.S. Lewis observes that
writing does not participate in speech (it is symbolic), which the light
in a photograph does participate in the light of the sun in a fashion,
being a record of it. So if the Eucharist is a sacrament, then the bread
and wine participate in God in some fashion, hence the “real presence” of
God.
The synthesis began fraying in the 12th century from a number of factors,
but the first one was the increasing political power of the Pope, which
led people to try to articulate the difference between the realm of the
authority of Man (the king) and that of the divine authority of the Church
(the Pope). This created a split in authority, which had hitherto be seen
as one. However, this sort of split kept occurring in other areas.
Berengar of Tours argued for the spiritual primacy in the Eucharist, with
the result that his opponents defended by arguing the opposite position,
instead of the synthesis; this split material and spiritual. With the
rediscovery of Aristotle came the idea of an independent nature. The
Reformation split Church and Scripture, with the Reformers taking
Scripture as their only authority, leaving the Catholics to emphasize
Church Tradition. These splits resulted in a split between the natural and
supernatural, since their synthesis became untenable in context of all the
earlier splits. Boersma notes that the first three of these came before
the Reformation, so evangelicals and Catholics both need to own their
responsibility.
Two additional developments cut the synthesis. The first was when Duns
Scotus (1200s) said that being is a category of its own. This put God’s
existence and creation’s (our) existence on equal footing, whereas in the
Platonic-Christian synthesis, only God has being in himself; anything with
being participates in God’s being. (This also looks a lot like idolatry,
putting something [existence] above God.) The second was William of Ockham
saying that we should take the simplest explanation, and the simplest
explanation is that universals (the Forms) do not exist but we name them
as such because we all generalize the same way, which has come to be known
as nominalism. This led to voluntarism: things are good not because they
participate in the nature of God but because he declares them that
way—and he could, in theory, change his definition. This led to the
conclusion that God could alter the rules in specific situations, which
ultimately led to theological skepticism.
Both Luther and Calvin attempted to repair the synthesis, but they failed
because they had been influenced by some of the thinking, and so their
repair was incomplete. While the Reformation did have good aspects, such
as the emphasis on the Bible, personal Bible reading, evangelism, and a
“flowering of hymnody”, the failure of the Reformation to repair the
synthesis has led to our individualism, which is causing the good things
to be lost. Younger evangelical theologians are reacting to the
overconfidence of modernist propositional theology, but are doing so with
the post-modern turn. Unfortunately, skepticism that truth can be known is
not at all the same thing as mystery. A sacramental mystery is something
that cannot be fully comprehended, of course, but it can be partially
comprehended.
Boersma suggests that in order to reweave the sacramental tapestry we
need to weave together the Eucharist, Church tradition, Scripture, and
truth to work together into a theological-ascetical discipline based on
the Platonist-Christian sacramental synthesis. He argues that the
Eucharist must be properly seen as that which creates the Church: through
sharing in Christ’s body we become the Church. He argues that the
Christian view of time is sacramental, that events which are far apart in
time, like Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac and the Father’s sacrifice of his
Son, are nearby in meaning/purpose, thus sacramentally time becomes
unified in the Church (Old Testament and New Testament events, past saints
and present saints), etc. He argues that Church Tradition should be seen
(and is currently seen by Catholics) not as opposed to Scripture, but the
framework of interpretation of Scripture. The apostle’s teaching
(following Christ’s) showed that the Scriptures speak of Christ—Christ is
how we interpret Scripture. This makes Scripture a sacrament (it
participates in Christ, and thereby in God), and if it participates in
God, we should expect multiple interpretations to coexist. The medieval
view saw four coexisting meanings: the literal meaning of what happened in
history, the moral meaning of how it instructs us on living our life, the
allegorical meaning of how we see Christ and the Church in it, and the
analogical meaning of our end. Allegorical interpretations risk being
arbitrary when they leave the boundary of Tradition and are not seen
through the lens of Christ, but within that lens, because we each have
different perspectives on God, we should expect differing interpretations
and meanings expressing that perspective. Truth, since it participates in
God’s truth, is sacramental, too. But in this view truth is not only
something to be understood, but something to be participated in. Gregory
of Nyssa, for example, describes the progression from perceiving the light
of Christ in the purgation stage of sin-repentence cycles, to perception
of God via the senses, to going beyond the senses to a darkness where the
senses no longer perceive God yet the darkness is “luminous”. The role of
theology, then, is not simply understanding God rationally, which though
both good and essential, is insufficient. Theology should primarily
function as an ascetic training discipline that enables us to come closer
to the mystical participation and communion of the beatific vision.
In Heavenly Participation, Boersma gives a concise, yet
thorough summary of how we find ourselves in the current situation in the
contemporary West. He gives thoughtful suggestions on the theological
perspectives that we need to adopt to regain the synthesis, although I see
no evidence of any concrete ideas to actually achieve this change. It is
all very well to describe what “someone” should accomplish, but since the
rift within the dichotomies has only widened with passing centuries, if he
wants change, he had better identify (create, really) some new force in
the opposite direction. His suggestions would be a useful blueprint for a
church that was adjacent to the Great Tradition and wanted to move into a
robust Great Tradition. American conservative Anglicans might occupy a
Great Tradition adjacent space, although their evangelical leanings show
no sign of desire for a sacramental synthesis.
As of this writing (2012), Boersma identified himself as an evangelical,
and was teaching at Regent Seminary in Vancouver. I am surprised that he
seems to think that he can convince evangelicals to recover a Platonist
synthesis. I, coming from an evangelical + charismatic background, did
find his arguments persuasive, but I was already convinced due to a
personal awareness of a meaning vacuum, and interacting with eastern
Church fathers (largely mediated through podcasts). My experience is that
evangelicals (and charismatics) have no grid for transcendence, that is
participating in the divine unity, but focuses on the divine unity uniting
itself with our multiplicity. (To be fair, the desire of unity with the
divine is in charismatics, but it is confused with the divine uniting
itself with us.) In fact, because evangelicals, of which charismatics can
be considered a mostly-overlapping subset, agree with the
material-supernatural split and are largely unknowingly philosophically
materialist, and because “sacramental” is associated with medieval
Catholic excess, evangelicals are largely resistant to a return to any
Platonist synthesis. Perhaps evangelical theologians (who seem like the
audience of this book) are more amenable, but the rank and file is not.
Since Boersma joined the Anglo-Catholic Nashota House Seminary seven years
after publication, perhaps Boersma did not meet much success.
I was hoping that this book would talk about a sacramental worldview,
meaning that all of creation is a (are) sacrament(s), and how to
experience this. The first chapter gives a helpful summary of what a
sacrament is, and thus is useful to that end, but unfortunately for me,
that is not the book he wrote. Boersma does think that theology should be
an ascetic discipline to bring me to this mystical participation, but
unfortunately he offers essentially nothing. I am asking how to do
heavenly participation via a sacramental worldview, while he is giving an
academic defense of a sacramental worldview as the proper Christian
framework. I guess I am asking “how do I become a mystic” or “how do I
have the beatific vision”, which is a different book. But the book Boersma
did write would have been helpful to me two years ago in understanding the
direction to go (assuming that I would have understood it, which is
unlikely.)
This is a useful book if you want to understand the current crisis of
meaning and identify a path back to meaning. It is very readable, and
commendably concise. However, you should understand how Plato’s Forms
work; as a test, if you understand how God is Being in himself (or, the
Form of Being), you have this part covered. It will also be helpful to
understand theories of the Eucharist (as the sacrament par excellence),
in particular transubstantiation (which is not that the bread and wine
stop being bread and wine, but rather that their Forms change)
and Anglican “real presence”. Reading up on philosophical realism,
nominalism, voluntarism, and skepticism, as well as post-modernism, will
be helpful as well.
Review: 8.5
I want to give this book a higher value, since it is
refreshingly concise while still being thorough. However, I think the
audience is a little narrow. Also, this book is arguably a summary of nouvelle
théologie with commentary and critique, which is nice, but also
seems a little narrow in source material.
Part 1: Exitus: The Fraying Tapestry
Ch. 1: The Shape of the Tapestry: A Sacramental Ontology
- Those who say that theology becoming the primary authority would
strike at the heart of modern democracy are probably not wrong, since
modernity and secularity focus solely on earth, while theology calls us
toward heavenly realities. And if we do not make theology primary, then
other things are going to influence theology, rather than the other way
around.
- I am calling for a return to the Great Tradition sacramental ontology
(nature of reality; worldview).
- Looking for a “biblical ontology” is naive; we all have a view of
reality that lies underneath our interpretations, and usually those
advocating getting rid of ontology have a modern, nominalist ontology.
However, they are correct in that Christ must be central to our
ontology. “These concerns, I believe, were carefully safeguarded in
the Platonist-Christian synthesis of the Great Tradition. This
tradition was quite conscious of the fact that there is no such thing
as a universally accessible, neutral ‘ontology’ separate from the very
particular convictions of the Christian faith.” (21)
- “Mystery” and “sacrament” are almost the same thing, although
“mystery” means something which it is impossible for our senses to
convey; it is not a puzzle but something beyond perception. (This is not
surprising; most people would agree that our senses cannot fully capture
reality.) My claim is that the mysterious nature of reality is because
all of reality is a sacrament.
- A sign is distinct from the reality it points to: no driver swerves
to miss the deer on the road sign. C.S. Lewis (in the essay
“Transposition”) notes that the signs of writing are distinct from the
speech patterns they point to. In a sacrament, the sign also
participates in the reality. Lewis: writing does not participate in
speech, but the light in a (printed) photograph partly does
participate in the light of the sun. Reality gets both its being and
its value from its participation in the greater reality. (Thus we
could say that a sacramental ontology is also a participatory
ontology.) Thus a sacramental worldview has the “real presence” of
God.
- All Christians think that God has some sort of relationship with the
world; many Protestants say he has a covenantal relationship with the
world. A covenant is between two unrelated things, and a sacramental
relationship is much broader than a mere covenantal, participatory
relationship where the world participates in God (“in him we live and
move and have our being”). However, the participatory relationship is
what enables the covenant relationship.
- Lewis notes that we do not merely desire to see beauty, but we
desire to participate in it.
- The Eucharistic debate illustrates the differences between the
sacramental / covenantal views. If the Eucharist is simply a memorial,
then the bread and wine and God are completely separate (a nominalist
view). If the Eucharist participates in the life of God in some
fashion, then there is the real presence of God in the bread and wine.
- I have two motivations for my theological work.
- The first is that, since God is mysterious, we need theological
humility. God is not an idea, and cannot be comprehended rationally;
he must be experienced. “Modern theology’s problem is its rational
confidence—and thus, ultimately, its pride.” (27)
- Many young evangelicals perceive that propositional, rational
theology is woefully insufficient. However, that does not mean they
will necessarily turn to a sacramental theology: in this post-modern
age, it is easy to mistake skepticism for mystery. Theology is much
closer to mysticism than skepticism.
- The second is that we tend to accept cultural norms uncritically. A
local Christian, evangelical high school went to see the “Body Worlds”
exhibit. Nobody even raised the issue of whether it was compatible
with Christian values to buy bodies, plasticize the pieces, and
exhibit them; rather it was uncritically seen as showing the goodness
of God’s creation. It is definitely good to recognize the goodness of
creation, but as Lewis points out, when we make it a primary good, or
an end in itself, it both becomes an idol, and we loose the primary
good. Secondary good can only be retained if we keep it a secondary
good. The beauty and goodness of the secondary thing comes through
it; the beauty we experience is only the hint and rumor of the
beauty beyond. Modernity has made an idol of creation.
- Maximus the Confessor says that when God created the world, he
created the earthly logoi (words, creative purposes) based
on the heavenly logoi. The sin of Adam was to see only the
earthly logoi; “he had looked at nature in line with his
passions [animal/bodily desires], thereby reducing creation to a
purely material reality.” (32) That is, he desacralized reality.
- A sacramental view of creation would change our perspective of
Creation as something to be exploited, to that of the Eucharist,
which we are careful to let no crumb fall.
- A popular evangelical argument is that Christianity was corrupted by
Greek Platonism from its “pure” Hebraic roots. This is simply not
correct: Christians did not uncritically adopt Platonism wholesale
(although it was at times overly chummy), and they rejected three key
things from Platonism:
- First, Christians said that God was free to create or not create,
while Platonists said that the world emanated from the One by
necessity of the One’s nature.
- Second, Christians said that matter is good (partly because God
created it, and partly because of the Resurrection). Platonists saw a
hierarchy, with the One at the top, and the resulting multiplicity of
matter and the bottom; they saw matter as not possibly good.
- Third, Christians disagreed that unity was perfection and that
multiplicity was therefore imperfection. God himself, as Trinity, is
both unity and multiplicity, and thus both are good.
- The argument claims to be “biblical”, but it comes from “a
philosophical framework that assumes that the relational language of
scripture exhausts the character of God.” (35) (Plus, the argument is
incorrect, as was shown.)
- Christians recognized that Platonism said many things that were true,
and the Christian-Platonist synthesis (the Great Tradition) held until
the high middle ages. Aquinas is often seen as the cause of the decline,
given his rationalism and Aristotelian synthesis, but he quoted heavily
from six-century Syrian monk Denys, who was clearly on the Platonist
side. The decline is located elsewhere, which I will discuss later.
- Evangelicals partly think Christianity was “hellenized” by Platonism
because mediation by the Forms seems unnecessary complex, so lets just
discard it and go back to “the pure gold of the biblical Christian
faith” (38)
- BUT: the original proponent of the hellenization theory was Adolf
von Harnack, one of the German liberal theologians of the nineteenth
century. If a liberal theologian thought it necessary to divest
Christianity of its participation in the Forms, maybe evangelicals
should not uncritically agree with him if their aim is, as stated, to
protect biblical Christianity.
- Ironically, accepting it in defense of the Bible actually lessened
the value of the Bible. With the Forms, Creation, history, and the Old
Testament can be carriers of something greater, because they
participate in the greater reality that they point to. Without that,
they are lessened.
- “For the Great Tradition, the only way to make sense of the world was
by means of a sacramental ontology: God had graciously provided a
sacramental link between his own divine life and the time-bound order of
creation.” (39)
Ch. 2: Weaving the Tapestry: The Fathers’ Christological Anchor
- Evangelicals see Christ as the center, but there is no consensus on
the theological implications. I am a maximalist here, and agree with the
Great Tradition that Christ is not just the height of the covenant, but
the center of all reality.
- Irenaeus: Christ recapitulated humanity, where recapitulate meant to
bring all things into his headship (caput meaning “head” in
Latin). To do this, Christ had to participate in all of human life, so
since Adam came of virgin soil, Adam failed temptation, Eve disobeyed,
humanity dies, so Christ had to be born of a virgin, overcome temptation
in the wilderness, Mary had to willingly accept being Jesus’ mother, and
Jesus had to die. By Christ’s participation in all aspects of humanity,
Christ’s incorruptibility swallowed our corruptibility and thus enabled
us to share in his incorruptibility.
- Iraneaus offers a synthesis of one and many, whereas modernity
enforces sameness and post-modernity celebrates “carnivalesque
difference”.
- Athanasius: On the Incarnation asks why God became flesh:
- Firstly, so he could die in our place. When a king takes residence
in a city, he only lives in one building, but the whole city gets the
honor, and thieves and attackers avoid the whole city; this is similar
to recapitulation.
- Secondly, so the Word could teach us about the Father. The “image of
God” means being rational, to Athanasius, so we need to be taught to
be the image of God. We did not pay attention to what Creation was
saying, nor did the Jews pay attention to God’s teaching program of
the Law and Prophets, so the Word, the image of God, came to teach us
in body and form like us. (This is like when a painting gets marred,
the painter has to come and fix the painting.)
- Thirdly, because God could not simply declare us saved, because
death was close to the body, and so life was close to it. Stubble is
consumed by fire, and even if you keep the stubble away from the fire,
nonetheless it can still be burned, but if you encase the stubble in
asbestos, which is said to be impervious to fire, then the stubble is
secure. Thus we participate in Christ’s incorruptibility.
- The assumption is that all humanity shares in something common, and
Christ becomes the new humanity by taking on that which is in common
and becoming the common identity. (Thus, Eastern Orthodoxy sees the
Incarnation as restoring us.)
- Gregory of Nyssa: in On “Not Three Gods”, he is arguing
against Christianity as having three Gods. First he distinguishes
between the commonalities of the three (the universals) and
the differences (the particulars), just like Peter, James, and
John are three individuals, but all three are human, which is a Platonic
argument. This doesn’t entirely solve the problem, so he also says that
Peter, James, and John are each three “centers of consciousness”
[Boersma’s phrasing, not Gregory’s], while the three members of the
Trinity are united and you cannot say that the father does one thing
while the Spirit does another (“the external activities of the Trinity
are indivisible”), rather, “‘every operation whic extends from God to
the Creation, and is named according to our variable conceptions of it,
has its origin from the Father, and proceeds through the Son, and is
perfected in the Holy Spirit’” (49). Obviously Peter, James, and John do
not have a common will like this. In fact, claiming the Trinity to be
three gods is like saying Peter, James, and John have three humanities,
which they obviously do not.
- The Platonic idea of participating in unity is a tool Christianity
used to express the meaning that Creation has because it participates in
God. But Gregory also diverges, because while he agreed that God is
unchanging Good, he disagreed that man’s changeability was evil: because
we can change, this means that we can become more and more like God.
- The Platonic tools allowed Christianity to locate our identity and
meaning outside of changing events of history and in the unchanging
Trinity. “The fragmentation of postmodernity witnesses to the fact that
once we lose this christological foundation, natural realities end up
drifting anchorless in the raging waves of history. To put it
differently, the loss of the christologicasl thread undermines the unity
of the sacramental tapestry. Culturally, therefore, we are more than
ever in need of a philosophical position that allows us to maintain that
universals are real, as well as a theological position that argues that
they find their reality in the eternal Word of God.” (51)
Ch. 3: Unraveling the Tapestry: The Medieval Revolt of Nature
- The writers of the nouvelle théologie [French mid-20th
century Catholic movement; “new theology” was a term applied by their
opponents] identified five areas that led to the breakdown of the
Platonism-Christian synthesis:
- Changing nature of authority: Yves Congar saw the Gregorian Reforms
of in the late 11th century, which led to greatly increased papal
authority, rivaling kings, as the earliest cause. Although increased
authority could, in theory, have increased the Platonism-Christian
synthesis, it did the opposite. Previously God was assumed to act
through the Church as he did through the Scriptures, but as the
Church’s authority increased, there was scrutiny placed on the
differences between the Church’s divine authority and its human
authority. This split was new, and authority began to be seen as
something extrinsic to the hierarchy, rather than God working through
the life of the Church. Human authority became independent,
desacralized. Similarly, God’s authority became something external
(supernatural) imposed on the (natural) world.
- Splitting material and spiritual: Henri de Lubac identified this as
starting with Berengar of Tours, who focused on the spiritual presence
of Christ in the Eucharistic elements above the natural. His
opponents, wanting to defend the sacrament, went the other direction
and focused on Christ’s presence materially. But both were already
thinking non-Platonically, by splitting material and spiritual,
instead of a sacrament participating in its reality.
- The discovery of independent Nature: Dominique Chenu argued that the
discovery of Aristotle and a Nature working independently, which
highlighted natural law and human reason, was a large desacralizing
force. Nature worked on its own, independent of spiritual forces. It
also could exist as an end in itself [generally seen as idolatry].
Furthermore, the vow of mendicancy of the friars was in direct
opposition to the Church feudal system. “‘The mendicants renounced
feudalism in the same way that liberation movements have separated
themselves from capitalism, by gospel inspiration, not by ideological
persuasion. The return to the gospel brings a break with debilitating
institutional structures as with inappropriate personal behaviour.’”
(59, quoting Chenu) “‘St. Thomas ... continually challenged the
Platonic worldview with its dualism of matter and spirit, its split
into two of human intelligence, its too easy contempt for sensible
[able to be sensed] things, and its seduction by spiritual escapism.’”
(59, quoting Chenu)
- Splitting of Church and Scripture: Congar argued that the increasing
authority of the Church led to questioning the assumption of the prior
millennium that Church and Scripture “co-inhere”. George Tavard was
the first to question it, but in the 13th century, Henry of Ghent
asked the question, “which is more authoritative, Scripture or the
Church?”. Wycliffe and William of Ockham answered it that Scripture
definitely was more authoritative. The Reformers took their side,
while the Counter-Reformation took the opposite side, that the Church
had more authority. Again, this was splitting what had formerly been
joined; until then “‘we find a conviction of a permanent action of the
Spirit inspiring Christians, churchmen, councils, sacred writers: for
every right explanation or determination that occurs in the life of
the Church comes from the Holy Spirit. The thought here is less
historical than theological and sacramental.’” (63, quoting Cognar)
- Splitting natural and supernatural: In the previous four
developments, people had found it increasingly difficult to keep the
natural and supernatural together, and as the natural world became
more prominent, the supernatural became less. De Lubac argued that the
Neo Thomist Scholasticism overreacted to the Reformation and furthered
the descralization. They introduced the idea of the “pure nature”
before the Fall, which further increased Man as an independent agent,
and they began to assert that everyone did not have a natural desire
for the beatific vision (union with God).
- Four out of the five happened before the Reformation, so any
ecumenicial rapprochement is going to to required
Protestants/Evangelicals and Catholics to humbly recognize that they are
both inhabiting the same problem.
Ch. 4: Cutting the Tapestry: The Scissors of Modernity
- Contemporary scholars agree with the nouvelle théologie‘s
conclusions, but also add two other major developments (which they see
as primary and ignore the previous five). This explanation of the
contemporary situation comes from Radical Orthodoxy and people like
Louis Dupré. Radical Orthodoxy has some problems (like a postmodern
inability to affirm the goodness of boundaries), but it does strongly
assert that creation participates in God, so it is worth looking at the
claims.
- First, the Platonic-Christian synthesis does not, as some claim, imply
pantheism. Platonism does imply pantheism, since creation is involuntary
emanations of the One, but Christians were careful to say that there is
a vast gulf between God and creation and creation is merely a
sacrament. Creation participates in God, and by analogies it and we can
describe God’s character, but those analogies are just analogies; God’s
nature cannot be understood. Creation is similar to God, but it is also
vastly different. Insistence on the different (analogia entis)
prevents Platonic pantheism.
- The first blade of the scissors cutting the tapestry and sacrament and
heavenly reality was univocity, introduced by Duns Scotus in the late
thirteenth century. He said that being is its own category, since either
something has being or it does not. So the existence of creatures is the
same as the existence of God, and there is a category that both share.
- This destroys sacramentality, since creation no longer participates
in God. It also removes any mystery; the full reality of an object can
experienced with the senses.
- It is also a double idolatry. First, it raises being higher than God
(since God participates in it), and second, creation is both
independent from God and has existence equal to him.
- The second blade of the scissors was nominalism.
- Previously, for Aquinas, God’s blessing of virtue or condemning of
vice was because it participated or opposed his truth. Loving is God’s
character, stealing is not. He also identified, as two different
perspectives, God’s absolute power and his ordained power [this seems
to be what God wills]. Scotus said that God’s absolute power was
absolute, and that he could (in theory) use his absolute power to
reverse that which he ordained. So almsgiving is good because God
declared it so (but he could change that if he wanted). This is voluntarism.
“It is hard to avoid the implication that God has become an arbitrary
God who declares the moral status of human actions simply at whim.”
(77) William of Occam went further and said that God might actually
use his absolute power to override what he had ordained, such as his
divine choice of Jacob over Esau, despite the lack of differences
between them leading us to expect equal treatment. By the late 15th
century, Gabriel Biel thought that God might use his absolute power to
hate someone he had loved, or to withdraw his grace (meaning humanity
could sin again). This naturally resulted in skepticism. The end
result was that God ruled over humanity from afar with absolute power,
not with truthfulness. “If creation depends on the inscrutable
decision of a God who totally surpasses the law of human reason,
nature loses its intrinsic intelligibility. Grace also beco,es a blind
result of divine decree, randomly dispensed to an unprepared human
nature.” (79, quoting Dupré)
- The Great Tradition considered universals (the Forms) to be real
(hence philosophical realism). William of Ockham said that
we should shave off that which is unnecessary, which he used to shave
off the universals. We don’t need real universals, because what we
call the universals are just names (hence, nominalism) that
we give that which we have identified as shared. So if there are no
universals, then Socrates and Plato do not share a universal Form of
humanity. Why do they appear similar? Because God willed it.
- The result of this is that nature ended up having its own ability to
act, apart from God. Logically, then, any grace would be something
applied on top of this, and must be different. So we get the natural and
supernatural, and it is impossible to perceive any sacramentality,
because “nature could pursue its own ends without considering any
natural desire for the supernatural goal of the beatific vision” (82).
- Similarly, Radical Orthodoxy saw modernity as developing “social
configurations” like liberal democracy and capitalist economy that “do
not take into account the teleological purpose of creation’s return to
the divine source of its life in God.” (83)
- “Ironically, modernity’s very insistence that creation must be valued
and enjoyed for its own sake results in the loss of any and all value of
enjoyment. ... [Since there are no inherent relationships between
things] The result is a nihilist constructivism in which value and
enjoyment are the result of external or nominal connections rather than
of a participatory or real bond with the eternal Word of God.” (83) Our
contemporary problems suggest that the burden of creating our own
meaning is too much for us to handle.
Ch. 5: Attempting to Reweave: The Reformation for Younger Evangelicals
- There were certainly medieval abuses and corruptions that needed to be
corrected, but we [evangelicals] will only do our history justice if we
see the Reformation as something to be lamented. There were some good
things, like the centrality of the Bible, personal and small group study
of the Bible, “flowering of hymnody”, and evangelism. However, all the
personal elements of the Reformation contributed to individualism, and a
number of the good things are in danger of being lost. I am being
consciously one-sided in this chapter, but I want to observe that
however you do the gain minus loss arithmetic, the Reformation did not
stitch back together the Platonism-Christian tapestry, and because the
reforms were caused by this unraveling, the Reformation failed to
address what caused the problems that required reform. The tragedy of
the Reformation is that it split the Church but did nothing to resolve
the tapestry.
- The rending of Christ’s garment was ultimately caused by the
unraveling of the tapestry:
- When the sacramental unity of Eucharist and Church was broken, it
was possible to pit Eucharist against the Church.
- The split between authority of the Bible and the authority of the
Church was already there, just widened by the Reformers. One of the
problems of the Reformers is that they often expressed sola
scriptura as if Tradition did not mediate Scripture. Those
after them then confused the material sufficiency of Scripture
(Scripture contains all Christian doctrine) with formal sufficiency
(Scripture contains everything necessary to interpret it correctly).
- Nominalism enabled the Reformation, because no longer were all
Christians participating in the Logos, but they were separate.
Ultimately nominalism led to our current individualism.
- Both Luther and Calvin attempted to repair the tapestry, but had been
unknowingly been influenced by other of the five elements, and so
failed. Luther tried to get rid of excessive naturalism, but failed to
realize that the natural/supernatural split itself was the problem.
Calvin tried to integrate nature and grace, but his other doctrines,
like double predestination, the complete thoroughness of sin and also
our utter dependence on God, undid those effects.
- Both Luther and Calvin ended up seeing grace as something external.
Calvin, in particular, saw grace as a nominalistic imputation of
righteousness. (This was partly because both of them wanted to keep
grace and good works separate.)
- Their failure to repair the tapestry lead to the current divide, so
if we are able to successfully reweave the tapestry, it might bring
about unity.
- Younger evangelicals [in particular Raschke in 2004; this book was
published in 2011, when the Emerging Church was still a happening thing]
see that the propositional faith is not working and have recognized the
need to recover mystery. However, they have confused post-modern
skepticism with mystery. It is not. Incorporating Foucault and Derrida
cannot help the situation, and only tears what remains of the fabric.
Part 2: Reditus: Reconnecting the Threads
Ch. 6: Eucharist as Sacramental Meal
- Nouvelle théologie is not the only attempt to return to a
sacramental ontology. The Caroline Divines like Lancelot Andrewes,
William Laud, Jeremy Taylor, and Herbert Thorndike had a sacramental
outlook, as did Coleridge and T.S. Eliot. Likewise the Oxford Movement
and John Henry Newman. However, nouvelle théologie offers
signposts, since their critiques generally apply equally to evangelicals
as to Neo-Thomist Catholics (just that the two take opposite sides
instead of synthesizing the opposing sides).
- We must start with the Church, because it was the Church / Scripture
authority that began the problem, and in any case, it is only within the
Church that the Scriptural canon was recognized. The Bible is the
Church’s book; it doesn’t make sense outside the Church. “Scripture
serves as the sacramental means to build the church; the church is not
the sacramental means to build Scripture.” (106)
- I find de Lubac the clearest articulation (he is also beginning to be
recognized by larger church), plus he was always able to love the church
despite it marginalizing him, and was always able to chart a path
between the opposites.
- De Lubac critiqued both Protestants (saying Calvin only had “virtual
presence” of Christ in the Eucharist) and Neo-Thomists, but it was the
latter that he focused on.
- Neo-Thomists built on the nature - supernatural divide, and the
philosophy - theology divide. (Philosophy being what we can know by
human reason, while theology only by means of revelation.) So grace
was external to nature, and remained extrinisic even when it had been
applied to nature.
- They also took a rationalistic approach to the Bible, which could be
provocatively summarized as looking in the Bible to confirm Catholic
theology. (Evangelicals also do this. Josh McDowell’s “Evidence that
Demands a Verdict” uses this type of approach for apologetics.)
- One example that de Lubac gives is Augustine’s sermon 227, where
Augustine compares how just as each grain of wheat gets crushed, mixed
with water, and exposed to fire to create the communion bread, each
individual is crushed in exorcism, baptized in water, and exposed to
the fire of the Spirit to create the Church. The Neo-Thomists divided
the Fathers into “realist” passages that supported their position and
“allegorizing” passages, and ignored the latter. But this is to
misunderstand Augustine, who is not saying anything about
transubstantiation because he is saying that it is taking communion
together that creates the Church. Paul says the same thing in 1 Cor
10:16-17.
- (I think evangelicals might be able to accept a sacramental
worldview if it weren’t for what it implied about the unity of the
Church.)
- Until the 12th century, the Church had seen three bodies of Christ:
his physical body born of Mary, his eucharistic body of the elements,
and his ecclesiastical body of the Church. Augustine’s sermon 227 says
that you become what you eat; eating the Eucharist makes you part of
the Church, which is what Paul says. The three bodies were seen as
one, joined in the Eucharist. Protestants focused only on the unity of
the Church and dispensed with the other body, while the Neo-Thomists
went the other direction and focused on the unity with Christ’s body
and dispensed with the Church. So, originally the “true” body was the
ecclesial body and the “mystical” body was the Eucharist, but the
Neo-Thomists inverted it as a result of the Berengarian controversy,
and the “true” body became the Eucharistic body and the “mystical”
body became the Church.
Ch. 7: Tradition as Sacramental Time
- David Wells has convinced me that, just as postmodern relativism has
pervaded secular assumptions, it is also the dominant assumptions within
evangelicalism. We evangelicals need to recover some of the Catholic
perspective on the primacy of Scripture if we want to remain fully
evangelical.
- I assert that there are Catholic evangelicals. The argument against
this is that Catholics see Scripture and Tradition as equal sources of
authority, but this is not a true statement about Catholics: although it
was true after the Council of Trent, contemporary Catholics do not see
it this way.
- The traditional argument against the Protestant view is that of
Irenaeus, who used the illustration of a mosaic designed to be of the
king, but the heretics take the tiles, rearrange them into an image of a
fox, and then call it the king. Tradition holds the design of the
mosaic; without interpreting Scripture according to the design, you get
an image of something else. Indeed, Protestants have innumerable
splinterings as they make slightly different pictures.
- Congar asserts that the Christian view is of time is sacramental. The
Holy Spirit enables past, present, and future to coincide. So while the
Sacrifice of Isaac and the Crucifixion are separated temporally by many
centuries, they are ontologically very close. God’s salvation acts are
not just individual acts in linear time, but there is mystery to them
because they are also acts in a different “order of existence”.
Modernity cannot see things sacramentally, because
- [This sounds similar to a Fourier transform, where things that are
close in frequency-space become rather different in time. Perhaps God
the Father acts in ontological space—God acts in the nature of
Being—which has interesting spatial-temporal results, with Christ
being the Transform.]
- De Lubac saw Christ as the great sacrament, and, as the full
revelation of God, containing in himself all theology/dogma. Theology is
“cashing in” on Christ, and thus theology/dogma cannot add or subtract
from Christ. Everything before Christ anticipates the Incarnation, and
everything afterwards memorializes it (thus, past and future are united
in Christ). Karl Barth says something similar: “while the Incarnation
was obviously a unique occurrence, ‘its attestation through the
existence of the man Jesus is a beginning of which there are
continuations; a sacramental continuity stretches backwards into the
existence of the people of Israel, whose Messiah He is, and forwards
into the existence of the apostolate and the church founded on the
apostolate.’” (128), albeit Barth does not think that revelation is
participatory (Christ is not really present in the past and future
events).
- The Neo-Scholastics saw their job as to figure out the meaning of
Scripture’s propositions. Thus, everything the Church believes must be
in Scripture somewhere. This prevents any possibility of theological
developments; for instance, the Trinity, while in Scripture in
incipient form, is never expressed in Scripture. Marian theology, even
less so. The Platonist-Christian synthesis thus is a challenge for
them.
- It similarly challenges evangelicals, who see the meaning of the
text for the original readers as the limit of meaning. With
desacralized time, Tradition has little to say, but with a sacralized
time, Tradition participates in the life of God (since all of theology
participates in Christ), and we have a responsibility to it.
Furthermore, desacralized time gives us the entire burden of choosing
rightly theologically and morally, which is unbearably heavy.
- Sacramental is the Great Tradition expressing that everything is
rooted in Christ, the latter which is something evangelicals agree with,
which we can see in the account of Philip and the eunuch in Acts.
- Congar (Catholic nouvelle théologie): The eunuch asks
Philip if the prophet Isaiah was talking about himself or someone
else. “Just as Jesus had done with his disciples, Philip preached to
him about the Jesus, taking that passage as his theme. To give the
meaning of Scripture is to explain it in the light of God’s plan,
whose focal point is Jesus Christ. ... the apostles’ preaching and
tradition did in fact consisy in revealing the entire structure of the
economy of salvation, in relation to Christ, as to its center, and
whom all the rest was arranged shaped, and took its meaning.” (131,
quoting Congar)
- Kevin Vanhoozer (evangelical): Philip represents the role of
tradition. 1) The Spirit leads Philip in approaching the chariot and
also takes him away. 2) Philip is connected to apostolic tradition and
passes it down to the eunuch. 3) Philip is like the Church as the
external agent that enables the eunuch to correctly read Scripture. 4)
The text (Isaiah 53) is both the same and different when viewed from
the perspective of the Tradition.
- When talking about theology “developing”, it is not that theology
changes. But rather, as Vanhoozer describes, we perceive/unlock the
meaning potential already existent in the Scriptures, or as Congar
says, “cash in” on Christ. (Vanhoozer also says that we need
imagination and “creative improvisation” to do this.)
- Since Catholic theologians have largely accepted Congar’s views, we
can see that Catholics see doctrine as coming from the Scriptures
(with Tradition informing showing us the structure, namely that it all
speaks of Christ).
- This does not mean that there is complete agreement between
Catholics and evangelicals, but it does turn things like debates
about Marian theology into exegetical debates: is Marian theology a
correct interpretation of Scripture; is Marian theology a
“legitimate exposition[] of the christological anchor”.
Ch. 8: Biblical Interpretation as Sacramental Practice
- “If theology is the discipline that facilitates the move from
sacrament (sacramentum) to reality (res), Holy
Scripture itself constitutes the divinely ordained means used by the
church to guide people toward the fullness of participation in Christ.”
(137, eio). We should study Scripture, and we should not become
anti-intellectual, but the historical-critical method bracketed the telos
(purpose) of the Bible, and that is also a problem (“If Scripture’s
purpose is to serve believers in their pilgrimage to the fullness of
Christ, even just a temporary bracketing of that final end would seem
out of place.” (138))
- Both Augustine and de Lubac’s view of biblical interpretation is
connected to how they view communion. Thus, people who view communion as
“real” presence are apt to look for the “real” meaning of Scripture
using the historical-critical method. [This seems backwards to me?
Perhaps he does not mean “real presence” in the Anglican sense?]
Similarly, if you have a sacramental view of the Eucharist, you are
likely to have a sacramental interpretation of Scripture. Allegory is
the sacramental interpretation looking for the meaning underneath the
literal, historical meaning.
- Congar (Catholic) and Vanhoozer (evangelical) both read Isaiah 53 as
talking about Christ, partly because they see the meaning of the text as
not restricted / limited by the author’s original meaning (for instance,
how a text is received also influences its meaning). However, those who
look for meaning beyond the literal, historical meaning tend to
emphasize tradition more, because there are lots of possible hidden
meanings, and we need tradition to give us direction.
- Proverbs 8 is an example. It is not obvious that the NT interprets
Wisdom as Christ, and some people (including Gordon Fee) reject that
interpretation of Pr. 8, although 1 Cor 1:24, 30 and Col 2:3 call
Christ wisdom). However, the Church consistently interpreted Pr. 8 as
referring to Christ through the Middle Ages; the “betting” of v. 25
even makes it into the Nicene Creed. Waltke objects that we cannot
base interpretation of Scripture based on dogma, but he forgets that
the Church dogma of begetting was defended by Athanasius against Arius
by exegesis of Pr. 8. “‘You cannot have patristic dogma without
patristic exegesis; you cannot have the creed without allegory.’”
(144, quoting Jason Byassee)
- We saw in Ch. 7 that we should read the Bible allegorially when the
NT interprets it that way (Isa 53), and when serious doctrine is at
stake (Pr. 8, above). More generally, though, the faith requires it,
as De Lubac demonstrates. Origen was aware of the literal
interpretation (he criticizes people for believing that in the
Resurrection we will drink material fruit of the vine instead of the
spiritual fruit of the Vine), unlike his detractors. (The one
exception was Gen 1 and 2). The lens for allegorizing was Christ; it
is that christological lens that which is why Origen saw the Hebrew
Scriptures as the “Old Testament”. De Lubac notes that the
christological clarity of Origen’s lens sometimes failed, and those
are the places where is allegorizing appears most arbitrary.
- But what was it that enabled the Fathers (and the Medievals) interpret
allegorically without becoming arbitrary?
- They saw four levels of meaning: literal, allegory, moral, anagogy:
“The letter shows us what God and our fathers did;
The allegory shows us where our faith is hid;
The moral meaning gives us the rule of life;
The anagogy shoes us where we end our strife.” (148,
translation of medieval poem)
Multiple meanings could coexist at once.
- Since Scripture was written by Holy Spirit, it is sacramental,
enabling us to participate in the heavenly realities, we should, in
fact, expect Scripture to have multiple meanings. Augustine
described the sacrament as the envelope that contains the hidden
realities.
- Since allegory was on the topic of Christ and the Church, and it
required the real participation of historical events, it was difficult
to go wrong. But as the Platonist-Christian synthesis broke apart,
allegory declined. “By rejecting the idea that earthly objects (as sacramentum)
received the reality (res) of their being from God’s own being,
modernity could no longer see that history was significantl precisely
because it centered in Christ and issued in the spiritual reality of the
beatific vision. Instead, according to the new approach, history had
significance in and of itself.” (151, eio)” This made the
“interpenetration of ‘history and spirit’” (151) of Origen impossible.
Ch. 9: Truth as Sacramental Reality
- The Church until the unraveling of the tapestry was less concerned
with understanding truth than participating in it. This means being
mastered by the truth (instead of mastering it), and thereby
participating in the mystery of Christ.
- Our modern claims of truth were based on “pure nature”, that which was
knowable by reason (thus, also, mathematics) or repeatable experiments.
This lead to technological mastery of nature and the confident
assertions of modernity. But this overconfidence lead the postmoderns to
show that reason was embedded in the particulars of its time and
culture, leading to skepticism that truth can be accessed. It turns out
that “truth was in need of at least some kind of transcendence
to uphold its claims.” (157)
- Daniélou, in his introduction to an anthology of Gregory of Nyssa’s
mystical writings noted that knowledge of God, to Gregory, was different
from the modern conception. Human knowledge of God is limited because we
cannot see God’s essence, which requires humility. But knowledge is also
participatory. He shows Moses first seeing God as light (the way of
purgation, struggling to master the passions), then more deeply via the
senses when God spoke, and finally mystically in darkness that Gregory
describes as “luminous darkness” (we end in darkness because we are
unable to perceive or understand God’s essence, so the closer we get,
the less our sense are useful). In fact, since God is infinite, he is
always beyond knowing, and thus Phil 3:13 means that we will keep on
increasing in greater participation in God.
- “Truth, according to the leading Neo-Thomist, Réginald
Garrigou-Lagrange (1877-1964), was the correspondence between object
and intellect (adaequatio rei et intellectus). Either a human
statement dud correspond to reality or it did not.” (163) Obviously,
in this framework, mystical participatory truth like “luminous
darkness” is nonsensical. Thus, it was the Neo-Thomists that had
departed from the Christian tradition, not the nouvelle théologie.
- Nouvelle théologie referred to “analogy of truth”; similar to
Gregory, “the notion implies real heavenly participation, while at the
same time it retains infinite divine transcendence.” (164) The “analogy”
is because God is infinitely greater than anything in his creation, so
truth (and beauty and goodness) in creation is only an analogy. (That
is, it is sacramental: it participates in God’s truth, but only to a
limited extent.)
- The equivocity of the postmodernism (that is, there is no
correspondence between our language of God and God himself) is no
good, nor can it even be supported by Gregory’s negative statements
about God, since he was clear that we have some
participatory knowledge of God. But the equivocity of the Neo-Thomists
was equally problematic: since equating the Church’s knowledge and
dogma with true knowledge of the infinite God is overconfident at
best.
- Bouillard’s analogy of the truth meant that no doctrinal expression
(not even Aquinas') was the truth. Multiple expressions of
the truth coexist, since each creature perceives God differently.
Assuming that the perception of God was correctly perceived, each of
these expressions is analogous, differently expressing the same
reality.
Ch. 10: Theology as Sacramental Discipline
- (Koinōnia is “the [communal] life of joyous sacramental
participation”.)
- The OED has two definitions for “discipline”, roughly: a branch of
learning; and instruction and training leading to proper action.
- Theology is obviously a branch of learning, and this is how it has
been understood in the modern era. However, theology is also a
discipline in the second sense: theology leads to increasing virtue and
increasing participation in the life of God. “Theology is a sacramental
discipline: it is an initiation in which our ordinary created existence
is taken up into the truth, goodness, and beauty of the eternal Word of
God and thus participates by grace in the triune life of God.” (174)
- This requires the Eucharist, tradition, Scripture, and truth to work
together. [Describes Chenu’s thought, but the previous four chapters
covers it in more detail.]
- Chenu thought that the purpose of theology was “intimate communion”.
- Chenu emphasized both the rational and the mystical elements as
essential.
- Chenu said that contemplation leads to (social) action. (This
emphasis on action would resonate with evangelicals) However, Gregory
says that action also leads to contemplation.